September 28, 2014
The Islamic Caliphate (i.e. and not “State” as many refer to it, as it is neither sovereign nor recognized) has been regarded as one of the biggest threats for the Western world and for the always-fragile stability in Middle East. With incomparable organization, power, execution pace, and strong influence, and with funding from unknown sources, the Islamic Caliphate seems drawn from history books referred to the crusades of tens of thousands of Christian knights crossing Europe to fight against and conquer Jerusalem from Saladin and his Muslim fighters.
The brutality and harshness of Caliphate’s fighters is strange to the Westerners, who forget NATO’s atrocities in numerous cases in the recent past, as for instance during the invasion in Iraq in 2003. Both European and US citizens are not familiar with the decapitation of their own journalists, nor with the massive massacres of Iraqis, Syrians, Kurds, men, women and children. In our “delicate” or “human” perception of war and battle, we are more familiar with the image of NATO’s aircrafts, highly-equipped soldiers and officers that march in Middle East, in perfect shape and condition, being escorted by the mighty Apache helicopters. Our perception of warfare ends there – and then the cameras shut down and information gets restricted. In the contrary, the jihadists are sending decapitation videos, videos of massacres, and threatening messages against the Christians, insisting that their doom’s day has finally arrived.
In this respect, and regardless of the military invasion of the US and possibly of other allies, the role of Turkey is of paramount importance as a stronghold against the march of the Islamic Caliphate towards the European Union. Turkey possess both the military capacity to strike back the jihadists, as well as the power to balance or ignite conflicting interests within their leadership.
Without confirming nor denying any contact with Islamic Caliphate’s leaders, President Erdogan can determine developments in the region and assume an effective mediating role on behalf of the wider front against the Caliphate. He can also incite these developments that could impede or control the entry and activation of jihadists in the EU both via Turkey or through the Eastern Balkans. His renouncing to embark in the US invasion, despite the pressure exerted by President Obama – a situation that resembles a lot with that of 2003 when President George W. Bush was insisting that US troops need to pass through Turkish soil to invade Iraq, but Erdogan was turning him down – proves that he possibly has a certain plan on how to confront with the Caliphate, without forcing Turkey to get involved militarily alongside the US. From that prism, and as long as the goals of perseverance of the Islamic Caliphate are unknown, Erdogan prefers to stand by, shaping an image of confidence and determination in the media that his decision is driven by long-term incentives in the light of safeguarding Turkey’s security.
Should his decision proves accurate, both in terms of restraining the Islamic Caliphate, as well as in terms of weakening its influence ,with or without military involvement, it is certain that he would have achieved something big in a another field of negotiation: given his decision to (re)itinerate Turkey towards the EU and thaw membership negotiations, the balance of power between Brussels, Berlin, Paris and London from one side, and Ankara form the other side, would definitely lean in favor of the latter.Dimitris Rapidis
, Bridging Europe, Enlargement, Erdogan, EU priorities, European Commission, European Union, Geopolitics, Global Europe, Global Policy, Global Security, Iraq, ISIS, Kurds, Middle East, Syria, Turkey, US policy, USA